Friday, January 13, 2023
Newly Released Files Part 4, The CIA in Mexico City
Friday, January 6, 2023
The Newly Released Files, Part 3, Asciate ogni speranza, o voi ch'intrate
The Italian words chosen for the title of this post, “abandon hope all ye who enter,” come obviously from Dante’s Inferno which has the words inscribed over the gates of hell. They could just as easily be used for the JFK Collection at the National Archives though. This is not to diminish the tremendous efforts of the Assassination Records Review Board (ARRB), which oversaw assembly of the collection, the employees of the government agencies that did the work, or those at the National Archives who maintain them. Yet for those who dive in thinking a smoking gun lurks in the records, asciate ogni speranza, o voi ch'intrate!
1. 40,000 unindexed FBI records. In December 1977, during the House Assassinations Committee investigation, CIA headquarters answered the Mexico City Station's request for copies of FBI documents related to the assassination work in Mexico City because "FBI does not have the personnel to examine first 40,000 pages.... These documents are not indexed.... There no way to determine which documents relate to Mexico City except by search of each individual document." The CIA sent three people to the FBI to do the work, but apparently after the first day of work, they got through only ten of the 200 "sections" of documents at the FBI. (See pages 184-85 of Murder, Inc. on the chaotic filing system for Hoover's feared FBI files).
The researcher may find some comfort in the fact that the ARRB insured that the JFK Collection was indexed -- although hundreds of boxes of possibly related documents are not.
2. The CIA is not a monolith. It is often of two minds, but just as often it is careful as to which mind it makes public. For example, when Cubela's case officer, Nestor Sanchez, testified before the Church Committee in 1976, I asked him about Castro's September 7, 1963, threat that U.S. leaders would not be safe if they aided plans to eliminate Cuban leaders. This threat was made to an American reporter at a function at the Brazilian embassy in Havana. That very day, Sanchez met in Porto Alegre, Brazil, with Rolando Cubela who told Sanchez he wanted the CIA’s help in "eliminating" Castro.
Q. Castro does give a warning about United States leaders aiding terrorist plans to eliminate Cuba leaders, and you were doing that very thing.
A. There is probably a coincidence there. I don't recall that I knew of this at that time [even though the coincidence suggests that Castro knew what Sanchez was doing], I've certainly heard it since, but I don't see the point that you are trying to make, because if Castro is behind or was behind AMLASH [Cubela], then are you proposing that he would also publicly in the Brazilian embassy state that this was going to take place? In other words, was he telegraphing this plan that he had?
But while Sanchez was opining on this to the Senate Intelligence Committee, others at the CIA had reached the opposite conclusion. In a 1975 memo to Rockefeller Commission director David Belin, the CIA's E. Henry Knoche, wrote: "There can be no question... that this event represented a more-than-ordinary attempt to get a message on the record in the United States.... Castro's statements.... dealt principally with American political leadership, in particular President Kennedy, whom he excoriated in an extraordinarily provocative fashion... ('Kennedy is a 'cretin')."
Of course, Knoche's views were not new. When an interagency committee on Cuban affairs studied Castro's statement in the fall of 1963, before Kennedy's assassination, it concluded that Castro was threatening drastic action and might, among other things, assassinate an American businessman or diplomat in Latin America. It apparently didn't consider that he might do exactly what he said and assassinate the President. (Murder, Inc. pages 108-09).
Friday, December 30, 2022
The Newly Released Files, Part 2
The process for releasing the JFK files is like a slow leak. The information comes out drip by changed drip. The same document may have been released previously, but the new one will have a deletion, such as someone’s name, removed and replaced by the name. Nothing is dramatically new in any individual document. Collectively, however, they are adding to the story of a shoddy investigation of the assassination in 1963 and 1964, lackadaisical attitudes on the part of the intelligence agencies since, and a repeated lack of forthrightness to the public and to our elected representatives in Congress.
1. Richard Helms and Nestor Sanchez meet with DRE leaders. On November 13, 1962, as the Cuban Missile Crisis wound down, Helms and Sanchez met with Luis Rocha and Jose Lasa of the Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil (DRE). Helms was Deputy Director for Plans, the #2 job, at the CIA. Sanchez was a case officer (he handled agents) in what was then called Task Force W, run by Bill Harvey. It would be renamed the Special Affairs Staff when Desmond FitzGerald took over a short time later. The meeting was held in Helms's office at CIA. Helms used his real name; Sanchez used an alias. Helms outlined the purpose of the meeting was first to gain information on the status of the Soviet missiles in Cuba and second to discuss the CIA/DRE relationship. This memorandum of the meeting gives a good feel for how the CIA did business in those days, but this isn't what is important about the document.
Rather, the important thing is what would happen later. Sanchez would go on to become the CIA's case officer dealing with Rolando Cubela in a plot to overthrow/assassinate Fidel Castro. Just over a year later, November 22, 1963, the two men would meet in a safehouse in Paris. At the meeting, Sanchez promised Cubela rifles with telescopic sights and a poison pen (or a dart pen). This later meeting would end abruptly upon word of the President's death. That Sanchez would be the case officer both for DRE and Cubela might make sense because Cubela had led the DRE in Cuba during the Revolution.
I was unaware of Sanchez's connection to the DRE when I was on the Church Committee. I don't know if others on the committee were aware of this. I never saw it mentioned in the documents. The bottom line is that the CIA was in a ticklish position dealing with the Church Committee. If it were forthright and told the committee that Sanchez had served as case officer to the DRE, the committee would surely have delved deeper into DRE and Oswald.
The Warren Commission was interested in the DRE because Lee Harvey Oswald had a street confrontation with members in New Orleans in August 1963 and a debate on radio with one member. At the time, Oswald was pro-Castro while the U.S. branch of DRE was anti-Castro. The bottom line is that CIA had been in the same ticklish position with the Warren Commission. If it told the commission about its own ties to DRE, the commission might have been led to Sanchez and thus have learned about the CIA's plot to kill Castro.
2. Recruitment of Esebio AZCUE Lopez. Azcue was the Cuban consul in Mexico City with whom Oswald met and argued during his visit there in September-October 1963. Oswald wanted a visa to Cuba. Azcue supposedly didn't like Oswald and told him he was giving the Cuban Revolution a bad name. Azcue would leave his post in Mexico and return to Cuba on November 18, 1963, four days before Kennedy was murdered. The CIA assured the Warren Commission that Azcue's replacement had been announced well in advance, thus presumably demonstrating there was nothing sinister in his seemingly hightailing it back to Cuba before the assassination. However, again the CIA wasn't forthright. It didn't tell the commission that it had given the green light to Azcue's recruitment -- although it didn't think he would be amenable. Notably, the commission didn't get confirmation about Azcue's reason for leaving Mexico until a week before its report was publicly released. He was finally questioned about his encounter with Oswald by the House Assassinations Committee more than twenty years later. His testimony stuck to what was in the Warren Report.
3. Gilberto Policarpo Lopez. His story may be found in earlier posts on this blog, but the new releases merit revisiting his tale. Lopez crossed (fled?) from Texas into Mexico about twelve hours after the assassination. He arrived in Mexico City on November 25 and stayed in a hotel until flying to Havana as the only passenger on a regularly scheduled Cubana Airlines flight with a crew of nine. CIA surveillance cameras at the Mexico City airport took a picture of him about to board the plane. He wore sunglasses. It was 7:00 pm. The sunglasses hinder identification and suggest he had been warned about the surveillance.
In March 1964, the CIA received a report from Mexican police saying Lopez had been "involved in the assassination." The CIA did nothing to investigate this report, nor did it tell the Warren Commission. In fact, it did just the opposite. When the Warren Commission staff visited Mexico City in April, the CIA station assured them that it had received nothing to suggest a conspiracy even though it had received the report on Lopez a month earlier. Later FBI reports established that Lopez had been living in Tampa, but the FBI did not tell the agent doing the investigation of the allegation that Lopez was involved in the assassination. The agent reported that on November 17 Lopez was at a meeting of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee awaiting a phone call from Cuba for the go-ahead to return to the island (he had visited before). There was no phone call. The next day, President Kennedy visited Tampa. This was the same day Azcue left Mexico. The same open-air convertible that ferried Kennedy around Tampa would be used in Dallas four days later. And Lopez would leave for Texas on November 20, the same day the CIA signaled Cubela that it would provide him assassination weapons, and the same day Lee Harvey Oswald must have made the decision to kill Kennedy.
The Church Committee's report was the first public mention of Lopez's possible connection to Kennedy's assassination. With its mandate expiring, it recommended the newly-formed House Assassinations Committee continue the investigation. However, because I wasn't satisfied that we had left no stone unturned, I went to the Secret Service to see if perhaps it had investigated Lopez. After all, the Mexican police had claimed he was involved in Kennedy's assassination, and so I thought the Secret Service might have followed up as part of its protection of future presidents. I had experience in the Army intelligence with "watch lists" of possible threats to visiting bigwigs. For this reason, I went to Secret Service headquarters where I gave an agent identifying information on Lopez. After entering that information into his computer, he announced that the Secret Service had no file on Lopez. "What is he alleged to have done?" the agent asked. "Assassinate John Kennedy," I answered. "Check with the CIA." The CIA may not have been of much help. According to a document in the 2017 releases, the CIA Office of Security didn't have Lopez in its database before the Church Committee began investigating.In the end, while the House Assassinations Committee report chided the CIA for its derelictions in 1963 and 1964, it did not investigate on its own. Instead, it ventured that the Mexican police allegation about Lopez was probably wrong. However, since the House report does not mention President Kennedy's visit to Tampa on November 18, it didn't seem to understand how sinister the known facts about Lopez were and remain. Johnny Roselli was part of the underworld that the CIA recruited to assassinate Castro in the 1960-1962 time frame. He had contacts in Cuba who were close enough to Castro to kill him. In 1967, Roselli's lawyer suggested to the FBI that Castro had dispatched "teams" to several different cities to kill Kennedy. Roselli had no memory of any of this when he testifed to the Church Committee. He was murdered six months later. The question remains: Was Lopez on a team in Tampa?
Friday, December 23, 2022
The Newly Released JFK Files, Part 1
Since Murder, Inc. approaches President Kennedy's assassination from a different direction than most writers, I naturally have a different view of the National Archives' December 15 release of 13,000 documents in its collection that were formerly redacted or withheld. The common approach is what might be called a "treasure hunt," looking for a smoking gun or needle in a haystack. None was found.
I saw all the documents the CIA withheld from disclosure in the Warren Report when I was on the Senate intelligence committee staff in 1975-76. The CIA never had a "smoking gun" because it didn't fully investigate Kennedy's assassination. And this was because at the very moment of the killing in Dallas, the CIA was meeting with an agent in a plot to assassinate Fidel Castro. As astonishing as it may be, no evidence has ever been produced that the CIA investigated a connection between its plot and the Kennedy assassination. That is the point of my book.
Moreover, while it is important to keep up the pressure on the government to release all the withheld and redacted documents in the JFK collection at the National Archives, it is also important to recognize that significant documents are not even in the collection.
Among the documents missing from the collection are these.
1. The Senate intelligence committee's transcripts of the CIA's JMWAVE chief, Ted Shackley, and the CIA's Tom Karamessines, who was Richard Helms's executive officer in 1963. In these transcripts, Shackley provided seemingly-informed speculation that the CIA investigated a connection between Kennedy's murder and its own plots against Castro. Karamessinves talked about why he tried to prevent Mexican authorities from arresting Silvia Duran, the Cuban consulate employee who befriended Oswald in his attempt to get a visa to Cuba.
2. A memo of August 13, 1963, from the CIA's Desmond FitzGerald to Joseph Califano of the Department of the Army entitled "U.S. Courses of Action in the Event of a Military Revolt in Cuba." The National Archives said this memo was turned over and seven copies made, but all copies have vanished. The significance of the memo is that in August of 1963, FitzGerald was seeking Califano's help in identifying conspirators in Cuba who would join a CIA-sponsored coup. Among the names on which Califano furnished details was Rolando Cubela.
3. An audio tape of the August 15, 1963, meeting at the White House attended by President Kennedy, and NSC advisor McGeorge Bundy and from the CIA, Director John McCone, Richard Helms, William Colby, and Bruce Cheever. The tape was never identified to the Assassination Records Review Board, "ARRB," and is not part of the JFK Collection at the Archives but rather is at the Kennedy Library in Boston. Eighteen minutes are withheld as secret.
4. The National Security Agency's internal report on its inspection of the Russian radio, a portable Turist model, that was found in Oswald's room after the assassination. Although other NSA documents indicate such a report was the basis for a letter NSA wrote the Warren Commission and imply that the Turist might be a spy radio, NSA responded to an FOIA request I made in researching Murder, Inc., by saying the document no longer exists. This "lost" report took on added significance when the National Archives denied my request to have an expert examine the radio, giving the strange explanation that it was evidence in a crime. Photographs of the inside of the radio show changes from either accidental damage or intentional changes. I hoped to determine if it could pick up shortwave transmissions that would have allowed Oswald to listen to radio stations in Cuba.
5. The full contents of CIA Director McCone's memorandum of his briefing of President Lyndon Johnson on the night of November 28, 1963, at Johnson's house, The Elms, in northwest Washington, D.C. The parts of the memorandum which are public indicate that the President asked McCone about Cuba. Again, this document was not identified to the ARRB and is not at the National Archives.
In addition, accompanying this year's December 15 release is a letter from the current director of the CIA, suggesting that it will never agree to the release of some documents in the foreseeable future. One reason is the familiar sources-and-methods claim. The CIA says:
Human assets and sources are the bedrock of the CIA's clandestine intelligence collection mission, and the continued confidentiality of human sources and assets-regardless of the age of the information or whether the individuals are deceased-is critical to the CIA's intelligence mission.... If current or prospective sources or assets learn that the CIA was required to reveal identifying information about its intelligence assets and sources despite the CIA's assurances of confidentiality, such individuals are likely to refuse to work with the CIA, seriously impairing the CIA's ability to conduct intelligence operations in the future.
But of course, the CIA has routinely released the names of its sources in many of the documents. This raises the question of the CIA's selectively protecting sources. Why is it protecting one dead human resource and not another? Besides, it is well known that source names do leak out all the time. The 1963 so-called AMLASH plot is an example. Although the CIA claimed that only a handful of CIA officers knew who its sources and agents were in that operation in 1963, most if not all of those names are public today.
More troubling is another reason the CIA advances for not releasing documents, and this is that it might damage "foreign liaison relationships."
Similarly, the disclosure of information about CIA's foreign intelligence liaison relationships is highly likely to damage such arrangements.... If the CIA cannot credibly promise foreign liaison services that their intelligence information and sensitive arrangements with the CIA will be protected from disclosure, the Agency cannot expect the same level of confidentiality and protection in return.... [F]oreign liaison partners may choose to limit or terminate cooperation with the CIA, significantly impairing CIA's ability to perform its foreign intelligence gathering mission.
The CIA's claim creates a loophole in the JFK Records Collection Act big enough to drive a truck through. As you will read elsewhere in this blog, I have pressed for access to records other countries, including Mexico, may have that are related to the assassination. They could be highly relevant to what history ultimately concludes about John Kennedy's assassination. But the CIA claims a prerogative to withhold information relevant to the assassination of the President despite the passage of sixty years if the information came from a liason relationship with a foreign government. To give the most dramatic example of what this might mean, the CIA is saying that even if a foreign government gave it evidence of a conspiracy to assassinate John Kennedy, the CIA would withhold that from the public. To the CIA, protecting liaison relationships is apparently more important than letting the public, and history, know the truth.
In short, the media is missing the point on its coverage of these releases. The CIA and FBI have not been sitting on smoking guns. None of the withheld documents or redacted material will prove the Warren Commission was wrong. However, these releases undoubtedly will continue to build the case that the Warren Commission's work was crippled by its reliance on a CIA and FBI with agendas different from the public's.
What the newly released documents say about this will be discussed in Part 2.
Monday, December 12, 2022
A letter never answered
One theme in Murder, Inc. is how poor the Warren Commission investigation was. Many times it seemed intentionally so. This is an example.
At the end of the Warren Commission staff visit to Mexico City in April 1964, it drafted a letter for the United States embassy there to send to the government of Mexico, asking for copies of the files Mexican authorities had assembled in their investigation of the assassination. It is unclear if the letter was ever sent, but it certainly was not answered. The Warren Commission files contain nothing from Mexico's investigation. The commission staff had discussed with Mexican authorities the Mexican investigation and had seen documents and reports from that investigation. However, no such documents are in the National Archives' JFK collection. Mexico apparently never furnished the commission with the documents the staff wanted. But the commission proceeded to issue its report without disclosing the investigatory failure.
The draft letter, below, is attached to David Slawson memorandum of the staff's trip to Mexico City, which is NARA 104-10150-10181.
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Tuesday, December 6, 2022
Tale of the Tape
Monday, September 26, 2022
The public's right to know
When I was a lawyer for the Church Committee in 1975, James Angleton, the head of counterintelligence for the CIA, and I left together after a committee hearing. We had to take an elevator down from the hearing room in the Capitol to the rotunda. Several celebrity senators like Walter Mondale and Gary Hart were on the same elevator. When the door opened at the rotunda, the tourists there recognized the senators and immediately came over to shake their hands and get autographs. On the way back to the Dirksen Senate Office Building, Angleton remarked that he never realized what it was like to be a senator. That is, he was surprised at the ready access voters had to politicians. He said something like, “How can they be sitting in a room listening to the nation’s highest secrets one minute and the next minute walk out into a crowd and start shaking hands?”
| James Jesus Angleton |
Angleton had spent his life in clandestine service, defending a democracy he had never seen in action. He typified many in U.S. intelligence in having an academic understanding of democracy but no “hands on” experience.
I always wondered why politicians wanted to be on something like the intelligence committee. It fed their egos of course. They were privy to information that their colleagues did not have. But how did this help them politically? It wasn’t like getting a post office built or landing a new military base in their state. It wasn’t even like sending a constituent an American flag that had flown over the Capitol. They couldn’t tell constituents about the good work they had done.
Of course, the senators did talk to reporters. On occasion, they might ask the staff what they could say in public about some secret they had learned. But they often just made that decision on their own. I remember distributing a paper marked Top Secret to the senators at a hearing. When the hearing was over and the senators were leaving, Senator Hart called out to another senator, saying in a loud voice, “You put that paper in the pocket of your jacket. It is Top Secret. You’ll have to leave it here.” Still, the senators were surprisingly good at “declassifying” what they heard and explaining it to reporters.
They sometimes made mistakes, but this is is a good thing. Democracy is better served by having politicians break through the morass of security classification and give the public a sense of what is going on rather than have the government operate in secrecy.
Friday, September 23, 2022
Kennedy's classified White House tapes
In the afternoon of November 22, 1963, Robert Kennedy called national security adviser McGeorge Bundy to ask who owned his brother's presidential papers. After checking with the State Department, Bundy told Kennedy that they were the personal property of the slain president. The attorney general then had the locks changed on the White House safes so that only he would have access. He told the president's personal secretary Evelyn Lincoln to secure all the audio tapes that had been made of the president's meetings and take them to her apartment. She did this and later turned the tapes over to Robert Kennedy.
I didn't bother to find out what happened to the documents in the safes, but I presume they went to the Kennedy Library in Boston. I did look into the tapes. Some, but perhaps not all, are at the Kennedy Library. According to the library's explanation, Robert Kennedy donated a collection to the library, but the library doesn't know if he gave it everything that he acquired from Evelyn Lincoln.
Although the tapes obviously contained highly sensitive information, since they included the president's meetings with CIA officials, they bore no security classifications. Nonetheless, after the library acquired them, intelligence officials reviewed and classified them. Of particular interest to me is the tape of August 15, 1963. The president and Bundy met with CIA Director McCone, Deputy Director Helms, Southeast Asia desk chief William Colby, and Bruce Cheever of the CIA. The library's listing for this tape says "Eighteen minutes are deleted as secret." Apparently the CIA or someone else went to the library, listened to the tape, and classified it. (See page 91 in Murder, Inc.) The library's listing says the meeting dealt with British Guinea among other things, but this doesn't make sense. The United States' interests in British Guinea were not particularly sensitive in 1963, and most of the CIA men at the meeting had nothing to do with the country.
The Presidential Records Act, which was passed later, would not have allowed Robert Kennedy to take possession of the tapes. But this is an instance where the government classified a presidential record after the president died and was succeeded.
The final oddity of the Kennedy tapes is that they were not identified for the Assassination Records Review Board and never reviewed by it. So the mysterious August 15, 1963 tape has not been subject to the periodic reviews for declassification of the JFK Records Act, and we may never know what is on it.
Thursday, September 22, 2022
President's Power to Declassify
Although I don't ordinarily defend Donald Trump, his statements on the president's power to declassify documents aren't as misplaced as some in the media make them out to be. He told Hannity last night: "If you're the president of the United States you can declassify just by saying: ‘It’s declassified.' Even by thinking about it." "There doesn't have to be a process. There can be a process, but there doesn't have to be. You're the president, you make that decision…I declassified everything."
Well, his going on to say that the president only has to think in his head that a document is declassified and voila it is declassified is an exaggeration. But there is no question but that the president can order documents declassified and that there is no formal process for this.
For example, during the Cuban Missile Crisis, a U2 spy plane flying over Cuba took photographs of the sites the Russians had in Cuba for nuclear-capable missiles. These photographs were highly classified.
Of course in Trump's case, some overt act of declassification is relevant since he's not president any more. But that gets into issues that are beyond the point of this post.
Friday, September 2, 2022
But Did He Read Murder, Inc.?
"Unlike some of his predecessors, Mr. Trump did not care about intelligence reports about U.F.O.s, but he would ask questions about the assassination of President John F. Kennedy." Trump's Taste in Intelligence, The New York Times, September 2, 2022.
I want to put a little humor in this blog. The FBI inventory of the material seized at Mar-a-Lago included several unidentified books, so maybe Murder, Inc. is among them. Now, I doubt this since Trump is not known to be much a reader. But in that case, why did he stash the books away with classified documents? Anyway, an author can only hope.:)
On a more serious note, the New York Times might have expanded on why Donald Trump is interested in the Kennedy assassination -- but not UFOs. And if he truly is interested in the assassination, why didn't he declassify the so-called "secret files" when he had the opportunity as president?
Thursday, September 1, 2022
Search and seizure
Some charge that the FBI photograph of the classified documents on a carpeted floor at Mar-a-Lago during its search and seizure there were staged to suggest improper handling.
Friday, August 26, 2022
Disinformation on Classified Information
Some defenders of former President Trump’s taking classified documents with him after he left the White House are running a disinformation campaign. They say there can’t be anything criminal in this because Trump declassified the documents. This is irrelevant under applicable criminal laws.
Scott R. Anderson of Brookings Institute posted a good piece on LawFare about this, “Does It Matter What (If Anything) Trump Declassified?” https://www.lawfareblog.com/does-it-matter-what-if-anything-trump-declassified. I thought it might be a good to review the law on this blog. In later posts, I will get into the declassification of the JFK records.
The criminal laws on disclosing national security information are not related to the security classification system, except for evidentiary purposes. The criminal laws ask whether the disclosed information relates to the national defense. They are not geared to what might be stamped on the documents. Those stamped classifications, like Confidential, Secret, and Top Secret, are creatures of Executive Orders. Government employees may be barred from having access to them, e.g., denied a security clearance, fired for mishandling them, or enjoined from making the information public. But government employees may not be put in jail for violating the Executive Orders.
There is wisdom behind this result. A joke told in Germany during WWII was of two men talking. The first whispered that they had to be careful because their friend Fritz had just been arrested for what he said. “What was the charge?” the second man asked. “Disclosing state secrets,” the first answered. “Fritz was a carpenter. He didn’t know any state secrets. What did he say?” the second asked. The first man looked around to make sure no one overheard and whispered, “Hitler is a fool.”
The principle laws are these:
• Gathering, transmitting or losing defense information. 18 U.S.C. 793.
• Gathering or delivering defense information to aid a foreign government. 18 U.S.C. 794.
• Disclosure of classified information. 18 U.S.C. 798. Note however that the words “classified information” as used here do not refer to the security classifications established by executive order but rather to “communications intelligence,” such as “code, cipher, or cryptographic system.”
• Communication of restricted data. 42 U.S.C, 2274. “Restricted data” is data concerning (1) design, manufacture, or utilization of atomic weapons; (2) the production of special nuclear material; or (3) the use of special nuclear material in the production of energy. Communication of such information with intent or reason to believe it will injure the United States or secure an advantage for a foreign government is a crime.
• Receipt of restricted data. 42 U.S.C. 2275. This essentially criminalizes spying to get atomic secrets and requires intent.
• Protection of identities of certain United States undercover intelligence officers, agents, informants, and sources. 50 U.S.C. 3121. Criminalizes disclosure of the identity of covert agents.
Several hypotheticals illustrate how these work. I’ll start with the strictest, restricted data. An independent researcher who has never worked for the government or read a classified document on atomic bombs nevertheless publishes accurate information on how to make one. 42 U.S.C. 2274 makes it a crime if he publishes his paper with intent to injure the United States or to help a foreign government.
18 U.S.C. 798 is basically aimed at communications codes. Disclosing information about the cryptographic systems of the United States. is a crime. If such information falls into your lap, say you’re a reporter, and you publish it, you have violated the law. Atomic energy information and communications intelligence are considered dangerous genies. Once they are let out of the bottle, the government can’t put them back.
50 U.S.C. 3121 on disclosing agent identities is odd in several respects. First, it applies only to the identities of agents that are obtained from “classified information.” However, it does not define that term. It seems likely that it was intended to apply to information that was classified under an Executive Order, but since it doesn’t define the term, who knows what it means. Presumably, if the agent himself tells someone that he is working for the government, the person receiving that information is free to disclose it. This is an odd result. Second, although the title says it applies to “sources,” it apparently only applies to human sources. It does not apply to disclosures about how powerful a spy satellite's telescope might be. Third, although the title says it applies to undercover intelligence officers, the text only applies to “covert agents.” The CIA, for one, assiduously distinguishes between “case officers,” who are employees, and “agents,” who are not employees. As I recall, this law was amended as a result of the assassination of a CIA station chief after his name was published. But the text of the law wouldn’t seem to apply to that assassination.
The two most frequently used national security laws are 18 U.S.C. 793 and 794. The second law is aimed at what everyone thinks of as spying. It is a crime to gather national defense information to aid a foreign government or injure the United States. For example, it is November 1941, and two people are taking pictures of the naval ships at Pearl Harbor. One is a tourist who takes the pictures to show his friends back in Iowa. The second photographer will send his photographs to those in Japan who are planning the December 7 attack. In neither case is classified information involved. The first man has done nothing wrong. The second has committed a crime.
Section 793(a), (b), and (c) overlap with Section 794. Section 793(d) applies to someone with lawful access to defense information who passes it to someone not authorized to have it. The section also applies to someone with lawful possession of such information who refuses to return it when asked. Subparagraph (e) applies to someone who leaks information. And subparagraph (f) applies to a person who, through gross negligence, lets someone else acquire national defense information and to any person who fails to report such a loss.
The bottom line is that declassifying a document doesn’t mean the document is no longer subject to the criminal laws. Take the hypothetical of a person who doesn’t know the document was declassified and who delivers it to a foreign power. He has the requisite criminal intent. The document is stamped Top Secret. If the information in the document aids the foreign power or if the United States is harmed by its being passed on, why shouldn’t the person be charged as a spy? With respect to the boxes of classified documents kept at Mar-a-Lago, the claim that Trump had standing orders to declassify any document that left the White House is no defense if those documents in fact contain national defense information.
Wednesday, August 10, 2022
Beware the Golden Rule of Assassination
I wrote this as an op ed on January 3, 2020 and submitted it to several publications. None was interested. I chalked it up to how little editors understand history. However, now with the arrest of an Iranian on suspicion that he planned to assassinate John Bolton in retaliation for Soeleimani's killing, I wanted to publish it somewhere. This blog seemed appropriate.
Beware the Golden Rule of Assassination
Qasem
Soleimani of
This is the
first time in history that the
It is never
clear who will pay the price of assassination, but a price will surely be paid. I make an historical case-in-point in my
book, Murder, Inc., The CIA under John F. Kennedy. The title comes from something former
president Lyndon Johnson said to a reporter.
When asked about President Kennedy’s assassination, Johnson said he
thought
The
parallels between recent events with respect to
The National Security Council analyzed Castro’s threat and concluded that he might order the sabotage of an American oil refinery in Latin America or the assassination of an American businessman or diplomat there. However, it did not know the CIA was involved in a possible assassination plot against Castro. Thus, it did not take his threat literally. It did not think he would try to assassinate the president, and it did not warn the FBI or Secret Service.
The CIA’s
assassination plot against Castro continued.
It was meeting with the assassin, offering him a poison pen and
promising him sniper rifles, at the very moment President Kennedy was
assassinated in
Murder,
Inc. concludes that President Kennedy authorized the CIA plot and that
President Johnson approved the CIA’s covering it up from the
Sunday, July 10, 2022
The Red Scare
Earl Warren clearly did not want his commission to stray into the subject of Communism. But his reasons for this are not so clear.
In an
earlier post, I pointed out that author Philip Shenon wrote in his book that
Silvia Duran agreed to come to the
Why was this? Warren and other members of the commission had the unpleasant experience of “Red-baiting” during the McCarthy era with claims that Communists had infiltrated government. Naturally, those commission members would not want to be accused of doing the same thing in investigating Kennedy’s assassination, at least not without good reason.
On the other hand, the introduction of the Warren Report does seem to parrot Nicholas Katzenbach’s memorandum to the White House onThursday, July 7, 2022
Radio interview
Dale Johnson of KFOR-FM in Lincoln, Nebraska, interviewed me recently. He was particularly fascinated by my books account of what the CIA was doing with respect to Cuba in the last week of Kennedy's life. You can listen to the interview on the station's website for the next several weeks.